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his thought-provoking paper by Michael Fleming raises 
several interesting issues in light of my experience, and 
makes an effort to establish some empirical regularities 
relating to different benchmark securities. After a brief review 
of the paper’s major conclusions, I will address a set of public 
policy issues that the paper raises.
Major Conclusions of the Paper 
First, the premise of the Fleming paper is that the value of the 
Treasury market as a benchmark will be called into question by 
improved fiscal performance. This conclusion is itself 
predicated on a trend shift in productivity growth and greater 
fiscal restraint that will lead to extensive efforts to pay down 
debt over a protracted period. 
Second, the paper contends that recent worldwide shocks 
and events including the Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) crisis “heightened concerns about the Treasury 
market’s benchmark role.” 
Third, the paper argues that increasingly there will be 
alternative benchmarks emerging for the pricing and hedging 
of securities, including the agency debt, corporate debt, and 
swaps markets. Much of this argument is based on the idea that 
these forms of debt are characterized by credit risks that will be 
more correlated with spread products and that these forms 
of debt will be a better hedge than Treasuries—despite 
disadvantages in such areas as market size and liquidity.
Public Policy Issues Raised 
by the Paper
Although the Fleming paper presents some interesting 
empirical correlations, relationships, and trends, it leaves the 
reader asking several questions—all of which have a public 
policy implication and none of which are actually discussed 
that explicitly.
These questions include:
• What characteristics should a benchmark security 
actually have and, more basically, what do we mean by a 
“benchmark”? 
• Is the premise of the paper, which suggests the need for 
new benchmarks versus a Treasury benchmark, actually 
relevant?
• Might it be that the Treasury market (on-the-run and 
off-the-run issues) actually functioned quite well during 
the fall 1998 crisis and during the run-up to Y2K in 
recent months?
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• Are the recent changes relating to the repo market and 
the eligibility of agency debt as collateral in Federal 
Reserve System open market operations worth 
maintaining in light of the discussion of alternative 
benchmarks, or are there reasons why this would be 
dangerous public policy?
• What are some of the specific advantages and 
disadvantages of each form of alternative “market 
benchmark” noted in the paper?
• Can we expect systemic and other forms of risk to 
increase with the introduction or proliferation of many 
different benchmarks and with the advent of many types 
of trading formats—such as ECNs and the new E-bond 
market? 
What Do We Want in a Benchmark 
Security?
A benchmark is a concept that can have a variety of meanings. 
One definition used in portfolio management refers to a 
benchmark portfolio of securities against which performance 
can be measured. Another meaning refers to a benchmark 
security whereby the market determines what specific issue or 
form of security can serve in such a capacity. Several 
characteristics seem critical: the credit quality of the issuer 
must be very strong, the issue must be very liquid (transactions 
should not materially impact the price of the security), and the 
overall structure of the market for the contract or security in 
question must have what we might call “integrity.” Therefore, 
the market for a benchmark security should have minimal 
prospects of being squeezed or cornered by participants.
Benchmark securities are also important for properly 
measuring and calculating the value of other securities in the 
same class or other financial contracts more broadly. Often, 
Treasury securities are useful because they reflect a riskless rate 
of return. As such, these securities can be compared with other 
nongovernment-backed securities subject to greater credit 
risks. In this way, Treasury securities help to define the shape of 
the credit curve by pinning down the overall level of the credit 
curve that all lenders and borrowers can see. It is important to 
note, however, that even Treasury spreads (and securities) 
reflect a large number of risks—including duration (or average 
life risks), financing risks, haircuts in repurchase-related 
transactions, and supply and demand pressures—for on-the-
run and off-the-run issues. 
Fleming’s paper often tends to confuse the roles and 
functions of a benchmark security with hedging, pricing, and 
liquidity. Although these many aspects of a security or market 
can be interrelated, it is clear that markets are evolving in the 
United States to separate these risks. For example, the swaps 
markets are critical for hedging and immunizing against 
certain forex or interest rate risks. However, swap rates 
themselves are based on underlying cash flows on fixed-income 
instruments or foreign exchange contracts—in spot or cash 
markets. Moreover, credit counterparty risk in swaps—thanks 
to International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
conventions—is being reduced as a form of variation, and 
initial margining is beginning to make these contracts similar 
to exchange-traded contracts. Hence, swaps or other 
derivatives are somewhat difficult to think of as benchmark 
securities under the kind of definition one might normally use.
The above considerations highlight the concern that the 
paper needs to be a bit more precise in defining what is meant 
by a benchmark security. It seems clear that a benchmark 
security should above all be liquid. Such a security should have 
simple properties and should be capable of being used as a 
building block in valuing other, more complex financial 
contracts or securities. In this context, it is critical that this 
financial contract and the market in which it trades have 
integrity, as I indicated above.
Why Will the Treasury Benchmark 
Cease to Exist?
One premise of the Fleming paper rests on the assumption that 
a business cycle as we know it will not be present in the next 
decade. Instead, economic growth combined with a small but 
persistent trend shift in productivity to about 1.7 to 2.0 percent 
per annum will generate very large fiscal surpluses. If the trend 
shift were to be larger (all else being equal)—as implied by 
some recent studies—then the speed at which the size of the 
Treasury market would be reduced would accelerate. Such 
assumptions have always proved questionable, as explicitly 
mentioned in Office of Management and Budget and 
Congressional Budget Office projections. Changes in tax and 
expenditure policies as well as possible modifications to the 
U.S. health and pension systems could greatly alter many such 
forecasts. In addition, despite the unprecedented strength of 
the current business cycle, a slowing in economic growth needs 
to occur—given current rates, which are close to 5 percent in 
real terms—with implications for future surpluses.
Even if one feels that the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
absolute debt level will fall dramatically, there are many actions 
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benchmark. Among these would be a number of simple steps 
that, if combined, could act as a powerful force to improve the 
depth and liquidity of the Treasury market. 
These actions could include:
• Further efforts could be made to reduce the effective 
Federal Reserve holdings of on-the-run Treasury 
securities. Here one can ask if the current holdings are 
justified from the vantage point of monetary control 
versus the obvious fiscal gains associated with holding a 
greater proportion of off-the-run Treasury securities, 
given the Federal Reserve’s role as fiscal agent of the 
Treasury.
• The selective reopening of key Treasury issues or the 
removal of issues from the calendar and the 
concentration of issues to create liquid benchmarks, 
which has already begun, could be continued or 
intensified. The Canadian authorities and many other 
treasuries throughout the world are adopting this type 
of strategy.
• A reevaluation of the issuance of Treasury Inflation 
Protection securities could be conducted. There is a 
variety of other, more liquid contracts trading that 
could be used to gauge inflation expectations.
• The investment guidelines for the Social Security trust 
fund could be changed to permit a somewhat greater 
range of investments, which would free up room for 
private market participants to gain greater access to the 
on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury markets. Ginnie 
Mae mortgage-backed securities, Fannie Mae mortgage-
backed securities, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation mortgage-backed securities (subject to 
proper structures) are examples. The investment 
guidelines would have to be specified very carefully and 
stress capital preservation. Such activities versus equity 
investment would certainly not seem unsound—
particularly in the case of Ginnie Mae securities. 
• In the extreme case—where the supply of Treasury 
securities becomes very small and where the Federal 
Reserve feels uncomfortable undertaking repo 
transactions based on the use of agency or other debt as 
collateral and sees value in a Treasury market—other 
alternatives could be contemplated. Specifically, the 
Federal Reserve could act to issue debt that it backs and 
simultaneously sterilize this debt issuance by originating 
an asset. Under these circumstances, changes in the U.S. 
legislative framework would be needed, as the central 
bank presently can act only as the fiscal agent of the 
Treasury. This idea presumes that having a government 
Treasury benchmark security is important enough to 
change the nature of the relationship between the fiscal 
authorities and the central bank. Such arrangements are 
not at all uncommon in both developed and developing 
countries throughout the world. This alternative is 
obviously not an option that needs to be considered in 
the short term.
The above considerations highlight the notion that there 
need not be a rapid deterioration in the effectiveness of the U.S. 
Treasury market as a benchmark for either on-the-run or off-
the-run Treasury securities.
The Fall LTCM Crisis and 
the Treasury Market
Fleming’s paper does a good job of documenting the complex 
issues raised by the crisis in 1998 and the problems of Long-
Term Capital Management, as well as the total seizing up of 
credit markets and the flight to quality into on-the-run 
Treasuries. However, it is very difficult to see how those events 
call into question the effectiveness of the Treasury market as a 
benchmark. 
First, even prior to the crisis, spreads between swaps and off-
the-run Treasuries were wide. 
Second, and more importantly, the widening of yield 
spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run Treasuries is in 
fact the kind of reaction one can expect in a generalized market 
panic, where many counterparties were unclear as to the extent 
of risks being undertaken.  
Third, recent movements in swap and other spreads have 
had more to do with large anticipated borrowing requirements 
prior to Y2K and less to do with systemic risks.
Perhaps most importantly, the LTCM crisis illustrates the 
fact that the Treasury market enabled markets to absorb an 
unprecedented shock. The lessons, in my view, have much 
more to do with the risk management techniques being used 
and the inability of models and techniques such as value-at-risk 
to account properly for extreme cases of liquidity risk, than 
they have to do with defects in the Treasury market per se. 
Finally, the role of hedge funds and prop desks in providing 
liquidity to the Treasury market is also important. Ironically, 
this will require very careful changes in disclosure policies, as 
the very nature of trading in any market requires that the 
participants have no knowledge of the size of the other 
participants’ positions. Moreover, recommendations relating 
to the disclosure of positions to regulatory agencies could also 
be problematic depending on how and for what purpose such 
information is used. It is very clear that the credit evaluation 
process used in lending to hedge funds like LTCM is among the 
more critical areas where improvements have been and will 
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Extending Y2K-Related Changes 
and Benchmarks
As part of the effort to mitigate problems related to Y2K 
monetary authorities, the United States undertook a number of 
actions, including a broadening of the set of securities that can 
serve as eligible collateral in repos with the Federal Reserve. It is 
worth noting that these changes in procedure will be reviewed 
to see if they should be kept in force beyond April 2000. 
Although not discussed in Fleming’s paper, the implications 
of allowing most forms of agency debt to be eligible collateral 
in repos with the Federal Reserve represent a significant step. 
This action provides added liquidity and credibility to these 
markets and might be viewed by market participants as 
enhancing the liquidity of the special benchmark security 
programs initiated by the agencies.
Ironically, and in contrast with the argument above, in 
many emerging markets questions would typically be raised if 
the monetary authorities were thought to be taking on credit 
risk by dealing in these securities. In the U.S. context, some 
would argue that this is a kind of back-door method for these 
agencies to assert that their securities are in fact backed by the 
central bank and U.S. government, thereby lowering funding 
costs. Such arguments might apply even if the U.S. authorities 
made haircuts when such paper is pledged as collateral. The 
public policy issues surrounding extension of this policy would 
be worthy of study, either separately or in Fleming’s paper. One 
could even look at the impact on the liquidity of the agency and 
other markets that these policies have implied to date.
Alternatives to the Treasury 
Benchmark
Fleming suggests that agency debt, swaps, and corporate debt 
markets will all become more important as benchmarks. 
Evidence does suggest that these markets are growing quickly, 
and agencies have been quick to see that their funding costs can 
be reduced through careful and strategic placements of debt, 
including the use of benchmark notes (for example, Fannie 
Mae) or reference notes (Freddie Mac). In the paper, some of 
the arguments made for the effectiveness of these benchmarks 
rest on their correlation with the U.S. Treasury market. In this 
context, much of the data in the paper are a bit confusing 
because at times it is unclear if the correlation coefficients are 
derived on the basis of first differences or levels when the paper 
refers to the correlation of daily yield changes. In other sections 
on market liquidity, it is unclear that proper account has been 
taken of seasonal impacts. In sum, I have some trouble seeing 
how the empirical work done in the paper supports the 
contentions made about the effectiveness of specific 
benchmarks.
The fact is that agency debt carries credit risk, and its 
correlation with spread products does not automatically make 
such debt a better hedge, as is claimed in the paper. Rather, the 
issue here is which financial contracts provide the best means 
at the lowest costs, including liquidity and other risks of 
hedging specific forms of risk. In this context, the swaps market 
offers advantages under many circumstances if such contracts 
are ISDA-conforming relative to agency debt.
Finally, the adequacy of each of these markets must also be 
assessed in terms of the credit quality of the underlying issuer 
and the implications for market integrity and systemic risks. 
Here, even the agency benchmark market could be viewed with 
some question. For example, the agencies have to increase the 
size of their mortgage loans and make other changes in their 
asset-side origination policies to be able to meet continually 
their supply commitments on benchmark issues. In addition, 
as interest rates continue to rise and as mortgage loan 
origination and refinancing drop off, credit quality could in 
effect be hurt and the integrity of the new benchmarks could be 
damaged. 
In sum, many of the new benchmark securities may be subject 
to credit quality issues that are business-cycle-dependent.
The Internet, E-Bonds, 
and Benchmark Securities
A last area not addressed by the Fleming paper, but a fruitful 
area for future research, is the confluence of risks that may start 
to be created by internet banking and the much more active use 
of electronic trading formats (for example, Trade Web). These 
risks would apply to the market for new bond issues as well as 
to secondary-market and after-market trading coupled with 
the development of many forms of portfolio benchmarks and 
many different benchmark securities. 
These developments will present great challenges in the 
design of regulations for the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and even for the Federal Reserve. Although such 
technological developments can create tremendous scope for 
reductions in transaction costs and can reduce the operational 
costs faced by financial institutions on the sale side of the 
business, the maintenance of market integrity could become 
challenging.
It would not take much imagination to envision situations 
in which a shock leads to a flight to quality and many 
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Importantly, the transmission of a shock to asset-price 
movements and the extent of volatility might be much more 
rapid as technological advances in trading formats become 
more commonplace. In such cases, the authorities’ latitude in 
ways to deal with the problem might be limited—purely 
because the speed of reaction necessary would not be feasible. 
More generally, issues relating to operational and systemic risk 
would become important. 
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